Real Emergence And The Limits Of Naturalism: A Gödelian Critique.
Is real emergence consistent with naturalism? And is there a case for saying that emergence is a feature of our world?
Emergence refers to the phenomenon by which complex systems give rise to properties not present in their simpler components (Chalmers, 2006). Of particular relevance is real (strong) emergence, which holds that higher-level properties possess irreducible causal powers that cannot, even in principle, be explained by the physical laws governing their lower-level bases (Chalmers, 2006; de Haan, 2006). These properties are ontologically novel and not derivable from underlying physical facts (Chalmers, 2006; Kivelson & Kivelson, 2016). In contrast, naturalism in it’s strong, reductive, physicalist form - holds that all phenomena are ultimately physical and fully explicable in terms of fundamental physics. This view entails both causal closure (every physical event has a sufficient physical cause) and epistemic closure (all truths are, in principle, discoverable through empirical science and formal mathematical methods) (Papineau, 2007; Keil, 2008; Lowe, 2000). It denies the existence of ontologically novel properties or non-physical causes, framing any apparent irreducibility as epistemic rather than metaphysical.
This essay argues that real (strong) emergence is incompatible with naturalism, as real emergence posits properties that violate causal closure and cannot be accommodated within a reductive scientific framework. To support this, the essay draws on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, which expose inherent limits in formal systems and, by extension, challenge the completeness of naturalistic explanation. Nevertheless, the essay also defends the claim that emergence is a real and indispensable feature of our world, supported both Gödelian insights and empirical evidence from complex systems theory.
A foundational concept for assessing the compatibility of real emergence with naturalism is the principle of causal closure, which holds that every physical event must have a sufficient physical cause (Papineau, 2007; Lowe, 2000). This principle underlies the naturalist commitment to a scientifically explicable universe, where reality is fully self-contained and governed by consistent, discoverable natural laws. Within this framework, all phenomena - no matter how complex - must ultimately be reducible to lower-level physical processes (Macdonald & Pettit, 1992; Chalmers, 2006). As such, naturalism, in its robust form, entails a bottom-up ontology that leaves no room for causally autonomous or metaphysically novel properties (Lowe, 2000).
However, the concept of strong emergence introduces a direct challenge to this naturalist framework. It posits that certain higher-level phenomena possess irreducible causal powers - capacities that are neither predictable from nor explicable by the physical systems from which they arise (Chalmers, 2006; Graham, 2025). These emergent properties are also said to exert downward causation, influencing the very physical constituents that gave rise to them (Kim, 1999; Campbell & Bickhard, 2011). Such a view directly contradicts the principle of causal closure, which permits only upward causation consistent with physical determinism (Chalmers, 2006). Consequently, if real emergence entails both ontological novelty and causal autonomy, it is fundamentally incompatible with the causal self-sufficiency at the heart of naturalism (Chalmers, 2006). It is this commitment that grounds the naturalist’s confidence in science as a comprehensive explanatory system: if all phenomena arise from prior physical states, then everything should, in principle, be fully explicable through physical laws (Chalmers, 2006; Papineau, 2009).
Real emergence presents a fundamental challenge to naturalism by positing novel causal powers that are not reducible to, predictable from, or fully dependent on the causal capacities of lower-level physical bases (Gibb, 2019; Graham, 2025; Chalmers, 2006). A central implication is downward causation, where the emergent whole exerts influence on its parts - contradicting the bottom-up causation assumed by naturalism (Kim, 1999; Macdonald, 2010; Campbell & Bickhard, 2011). This introduces a level of causal autonomy incompatible with a strictly naturalistic framework (Sellars, 1924; Chalmers, 2006). Since scientific practice is fundamentally concerned with explaining and predicting phenomena, strong emergence - which entails properties irreducible in principle - undermines the explanatory completeness naturalism depends on (Spiegel et al., 2023; Papineau, 2009). Taken seriously, strong emergence not only resists naturalistic reduction, but appears to require a rejection of naturalism itself (Chalmers, 2006).
This tension is sharply illustrated by Jaegwon Kim’s exclusion argument (Kim, 1989). He argues that if a mental state - such as a belief - causes a physical effect (e.g., raising one’s arm), and that effect is already fully caused by a physical brain state, then the mental state is causally redundant (Demır, 2021; Kim, 2014). To avoid this redundancy, we must either reduce the mental state to a causally inert epiphenomenon, or affirm its causal efficacy - thereby violating the causal closure of the physical (Kallestrup, 2006; Kim, 1989). In either case, one of two foundational commitments is sacrificed: either the autonomy of emergence or the integrity of naturalism (Demır, 2021).
In summary, real emergence posits ontologically novel and irreducible causal powers not derivable from physical bases (Schmickl, 2022). Such irreducibility requires metaphysical commitments beyond naturalism, which is grounded in physical causality and ontological parsimony - the view that physical reality includes only what is needed to explain observable phenomena (Osberg & Biesta, 2007; Cheng, 2023). Strong emergence, by contrast, posits additional layers of reality irreducible even in principle to physical explanation (Macdonald & Pettit, 1992). As causal closure is a core tenet of naturalism, essential to its scientific coherence (Gordon & Dembski, 2014), the introduction of downward causation and autonomous causal powers directly violates it (Macdonald & Pettit, 1992; Narimani, 2021; Gibb, 2015). Therefore, the reality of strong emergence demands either a rejection or radical revision of the naturalist framework (Kıraç, 2023).
In contrast to reductive critiques, some philosophers argue that strong emergence can be reconciled with naturalism. While Jaegwon Kim links naturalism to reductive physicalism, Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong challenge this, proposing a layered metaphysical model where emergent properties possess genuine causal powers while remaining physically grounded (O’Connor & Wong, 2005). Their account preserves key naturalist commitments - empirical science, physical dependence, and causal regularity - without reducing higher-level phenomena to fundamental physics. This model offers a middle path between eliminativism and dualism, and supports the view that emergence is both real and scientifically indispensable (O’Connor & Wong, 2005).
O’Connor and Wong offer a sophisticated metaphysical framework in response to the claim that strong emergence is incompatible with naturalism. They argue that novel and causally efficacious higher-level properties can be maintained within a broadly naturalistic worldview, without sacrificing core commitments to empirical science, physical dependence, and causal regularity (O’Connor & Wong, 2005). Their account marks a significant development in the debate by aiming to preserve both the ontological depth of emergence and the scientific coherence of naturalism. This viewpoint challenge the common assumption that naturalism entails reductive physicalism, the view that all properties and causal relations must reduce to fundamental physics (Papineau, 2007; Corradini & O’Connor, 2010). It is argued that this is not a necessary feature of naturalism, but a contingent philosophical interpretation (O’Connor & Wong, 2005). Instead, they offer a layered metaphysical model in which higher-level entities - such as mental states, biological systems - are ontologically emergent, possessing causal powers absent at the lower physical level (Corradini & O’Connor, 2010; O’Connor & Wong, 2005). Importantly, it is argued that these emergent features remain grounded in physical systems and operate within a law-governed, scientifically coherent framework - thus remaining consistent with a broad conception of naturalism.
An illustration of this is in complex biological and psychological systems, where novel patterns of behavior and causation emerge that cannot be fully explained in terms of their physical constituents (O’Connor, 2012; Chalmers, 2006). For example, while consciousness arises from neurobiological processes, its phenomenological and intentional dimensions - such as decision-making or goal-directed behavior - are not clearly reducible to neural activity (Chalmers, 2006; Fiala, 2012; O’Connor, 2012). Far from indicating explanatory failure, these features are, according to this viewpoint, evidence of genuine emergence, requiring explanation at their own level. Though grounded in the physical, such properties surpass it in metaphysically significant ways (O’Connor, 2020; O’Connor, 2012). This viewpoint proposes an ontologically inclusive naturalism that acknowledges the emergent complexity of reality without sacrificing scientific legitimacy (O’Connor, 2012). On this view, the universe is not a flat, mechanistic system, but a hierarchically structured reality, where new levels of organisation introduce new entities and causal dynamics.
Thus, O’Connor and Wong offer a coherent and compelling case for the compatibility of real emergence with a broadened form of naturalism. By embracing causal pluralism and ontological novelty - while retaining commitment to physical dependence - they present emergence not as epiphenomenal or speculative, but as a legitimate and essential aspect of reality (O’Connor, 2012).
However, the argument above is ultimately incoherent within the framework of pure naturalism as articulated throughout this essay, which holds that all phenomena are, in principle, fully explainable through physical laws and processes. The issue is, by introducing irreducible emergent properties - higher-level phenomena that cannot be reduced to or predicted from physical causes - it allows for causal forces beyond scientific explanation, thereby undermining the core coherence of naturalism (Chalmers, 2006). Such a move contradicts the reductionist assumption that reality is exhaustively describable in physical terms (Chalmers, 2006). The counterargument relies on a semantic shift that diverges from the strict definition of naturalism upheld throughout this essay. Naturalism is committed not only to physical dependence, but also to causal closure - the principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause (Lowe, 2000). Allowing higher-level causes that are not reducible to physical explanations breaks this causal chain and violates a foundational tenet of naturalism (Lowe, 2000; Ismael, 2013). While it is argued that emergent properties can remain grounded in physical systems, this view overlooks the incompatibility of irreducible causation with the continuity required by naturalism (Chalmers, 2006). As such, the introduction of causally autonomous emergent properties ultimately undermines the coherence of pure naturalism (Kim, 2007).
Thus, broadening naturalism to include irreducible emergence, as O’Connor and Wong propose, risks diluting naturalism’s meaning. If naturalism simply excludes the supernatural, it loses its strength as a metaphysical framework. For many, naturalism implies not just physical dependence but that all phenomena are, in principle, explainable in physical terms (Kim, 2007). Attributing sui generis causal powers to emergent properties undermines this coherence, edging toward metaphysical pluralism or disguised dualism. From a reductive standpoint, real emergence is incompatible with naturalism unless its core principles are abandoned. While higher-level causes may seem appealing, they compromise metaphysical clarity and scientific rigor. A stricter naturalism demands that emergent phenomena be reducible to, or fully explicable within, the physicalist framework.
To add to the aforementioned arguments, this segment argues that real or strong emergence is not compatible with reductive naturalism, and that this incompatibility can be formally demonstrated using Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. If naturalism treats the universe as a mathematically structured, law-governed system, then it must also accept the formal limitations of such systems (Jaki, 2004). Gödel’s Theorems show that any system of this kind necessarily gives rise to truths that are irreducible and undecidable within its own framework (Jaki, 2004). These truths – which stem from complexity correspond to the kinds of phenomena identified as strongly emergent (Krajewski, 2012; Jaki, 2006). As such, the following argument will demonstrate that the logic underpinning naturalism ultimately refutes its own explanatory completeness, and that strong emergence exposes an internal contradiction in the naturalist worldview.
Strong emergence is not consistent with reductive naturalism, and this incompatibility can be demonstrated by applying Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems to the metaphysical assumptions naturalism makes about the structure of reality (Dawson , 1984). Reductive naturalism claims that all phenomena in the universe are, in principle, explainable by physical laws - laws that are mathematically formulated, consistent, and complete in their explanatory scope (Papineau, 2007). It is a worldview grounded in the idea that the universe operates as a closed formal system: a set of base-level physical axioms from which all higher-level behaviors and properties ultimately follow (Tegmark, 2008; Papineau, 2007). However, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems present a profound challenge to this naturalistic framework. According to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, any formal system that is sufficiently expressive to capture basic arithmetic will necessarily contain true propositions that cannot be proven within the system itself (Goldstein, 2006; Jaki, 2006). These propositions are not hypothetically unreachable; rather, they are in principle unprovable. Their truth lies beyond the deductive power of the system’s own axioms and rules (Goldstein, 2006). If the naturalistic assumption is that the universe itself is a kind of formal, mathematically structured system - as its commitment to physicalism and scientific reductionism entails - then Gödel’s results must be applied not metaphorically, but literally (Jaki, 1988). The implication is that even in a perfectly complete and accurate formulation of the laws of physics, there would remain true features of reality that are not entailed by those laws. The universe, understood as a formal system, is necessarily incomplete (Jaki, 1988; Barrow, 2011).
These logically unprovable truths are best understood in metaphysical terms as strongly emergent phenomena. Strong emergence refers to the appearance of higher-level properties - such as consciousness, normativity, or biological life - that are ontologically novel and not reducible to, nor predictable from, the behavior of lower-level physical components (Jaki, 1988). Crucially, they are not merely epistemically emergent (i.e., hard to explain for now), but in-principle irreducible to their physical bases. Gödel’s Theorems provide the logical architecture to support this claim: they show that in any sufficiently complex formal system, there will be truths that simply do not follow from the system’s axioms (Goldstein, 2006; Jaki, 2006). If the universe is structured like such a system - as naturalism presupposes - then we should expect the existence of emergent realities that cannot be explained reductively. That is precisely what strong emergence asserts (Jaki, 1988; Hodgson, 1987).
This conclusion is deeply problematic for reductive naturalism, which is committed to the view that all of reality is explainable in physical terms (Papineau, 2007; Jaki, 2006). Strong emergence, as illuminated through Gödelian incompleteness, violates this core assumption. It implies that there are aspects of reality that naturalism, by its own standards, cannot account for. In fact, Gödel’s Theorems do not merely challenge naturalism; they expose an internal inconsistency within it. If naturalism insists on a formal, mathematical conception of the universe, it must also accept the limitations imposed by formal systems (Jaki, 2004; Hodgson, 1987). But accepting these limitations means conceding that not all truths about the universe are deducible from physical laws - a concession that effectively abandons the central premise of reductive naturalism (Jaki, 1988).
Therefore, real emergence is not compatible with naturalism. The formal structure naturalism assumes for the universe necessarily entails the existence of irreducible truths, and these truths manifest in strongly emergent phenomena that cannot be subsumed under physicalist explanation (Jaki, 1988). The very framework that naturalism uses to justify its claims - mathematical formalism - when examined rigorously, leads to the conclusion that strong emergence must exist and that it lies beyond the scope of reductive explanation (Jaki, 2006). In short, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems demonstrate that if naturalism were true in the way it claims, it would refute itself. This logical impasse makes clear that real emergence demands a metaphysical outlook more expansive than naturalism allows.
Adding to this, while Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems show that strong emergence is incompatible with reductive naturalism, they also reveal why emergence must be a real feature of the world. If the universe is structured as a mathematically ordered, law-governed system - as both naturalism and modern science assume - then Gödel’s logic applies directly: such systems necessarily generate true propositions that cannot be derived from their foundational axioms (Jaki, 1988; Jaki, 2006). This entails the existence of irreducible truths within the universe - truths that correspond to strongly emergent phenomena (Jaki, 1988; Hodgson, 1987). Empirical evidence further confirms this. Complex systems like consciousness, life, and ecosystems exhibit properties that cannot be deduced from their lower-level constituents. Consciousness involves subjective experience and intentionality, which cannot be reduced to neural activity (Chalmers, 2010). Biological life demonstrates symbolic information processing and self-organisation beyond chemistry alone. These are real-world manifestations of Gödelian incompleteness: systems that are expressive and complex enough to generate realities not entailed by their parts (Jaki, 2004; Jaki, 2006). Thus, emergence is not a theoretical artifact or placeholder for ignorance - it is a necessary feature of any system complex enough to model the universe. Both formal logic and empirical observation converge on the same conclusion: emergence is a real and indispensable part of the structure of our world (Jaki, 2004).
In sum, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems offer a twofold contribution to the debate on emergence. First, it has argued that real, or strong, emergence is not consistent with reductive naturalism and that Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems provide a formal demonstration of this incompatibility. If naturalism commits to the view that the universe is a mathematically structured, law-governed system, then it must also inherit the formal limitations that Gödel revealed - namely, that such systems necessarily contain irreducible truths that cannot be derived from their foundational axioms (Jaki, 2006). These truths correspond to strongly emergent phenomena, which thus lie beyond the scope of reductive explanation. As such, naturalism, when taken on its own terms, refutes its claim to explanatory completeness. Secondly, the very logic that undermines naturalism’s compatibility with real emergence, simultaneously affirms the necessity of real emergence as a structural feature of any Gödelian universe. In a world complex enough to host consciousness, life, and self-organising systems, emergence is not an illusion or epistemic gap - it is a formal inevitability (Jaki, 2006). Therefore, emergence is not only real, but metaphysically required by the structure of the universe itself.
To conclude, this essay has argued that real, or strong, emergence is incompatible with reductive naturalism. Naturalism relies on the idea that everything can, in principle, be explained by physical laws and reduced to base-level physical facts. However, strong emergence challenges this by positing higher-level properties - like consciousness or normativity - that are irreducible and possess independent causal powers. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems provide a formal basis for this argument, showing that any sufficiently complex, law-governed system will necessarily contain truths that cannot be derived from its foundational rules. If the universe is such a system, then naturalism cannot account for everything it contains. At the same time, there is strong reason to believe that emergence is a real and necessary feature of the world. Complex systems—from the human mind to biological life - consistently display behaviours and properties that are not reducible to their parts. These phenomena reflect the kind of structural incompleteness Gödel identified. Thus, even if emergence cannot be accommodated within a strict naturalist framework, it remains an essential part of any accurate and complete understanding of reality.
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