An Investigation Into The Intrinsic Nature Of Matter: The Case For Consciousness Predating Life.

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The Plausibility of Panpsychism:

A Philosophical and Scientific

Defense Against Core Objections.

Anonymous Marking Code: Z0179378

Date of Submission: 29 April 2025

Degree: GDip Philosophy

Word Count: 11,695

Acknowledgements:

I extend my deepest gratitude to all the individuals who helped me throughout my studies. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Tom Rossetter, whose expertise, patience, and unwavering support have been pivotal throughout this journey. Dr. Rossetter’s approachability and commitment to academic excellence have not only guided me through the complexities of this research but have also instilled in me a profound appreciation for the depth and breadth of our field. It is my earnest wish that this work reflects the high standards he embodies and contributes meaningfully to our collective understanding.

Abstract:

This dissertation defends the plausibility of panpsychism - the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality - by responding to its most significant philosophical and scientific objections. Rather than comparing panpsychism to rival theories of consciousness, the focus is on addressing four central challenges: the Intrinsic Nature Problem, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the Combination Problem, and the claim that panpsychism lacks empirical support. Drawing on historical parallels with scientific theories such as atomism and evolutionary biology, the dissertation argues that the absence of current empirical evidence does not preclude scientific legitimacy, particularly when evaluated through the method of inference to the best explanation (IBE). Panpsychism is shown to offer a parsimonious and coherent explanatory framework that integrates subjective experience into our scientific worldview. Furthermore, the Combination Problem is reframed as a general problem of emergence, comparable to explanatory gaps in other complex systems, such as evolutionary biology. By defending panpsychism against its strongest criticisms, this study advances the claim that it remains a philosophically serious and scientifically credible theory of consciousness, deserving of continued attention in both domains.

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………………..............2

Abstract.………………………………………………………………………………………….......................3

Table of Contents ………….………………………………………………........................................4

Chapter 1 Introduction………………………………………………………....................................6

1.1. Overview............................................................................................................6

1.2. Context...............................................................................................................7

Chapter 2 What Is The Intrinsic Nature Of Matter?..................................................9

2.1. Solution To Intrinsic Nature Problem.................................................................9

2.2. Causal Structuralism.........................................................................................11

Chapter 3 Solution To The Hard Problem….............................................................17

3.1. Hard Problem Of Consciousness......................................................................17

3.2. The Combination Problem Of Panpsychism.....................................................19

Chapter 4 The Scientific Case For Panpsychism......................................................24

4.1. The Problem Of Empirical Evidence.................................................................24

4.2. The Limits of the Scientific Paradigm...............................................................29

4.3. Inference To The Best Explanation...................................................................32

4.4. Explanatory Power In Science..........................................................................35

4.5. Scientific Plausibility Of Panpsychism..............................................................34

Chapter 5 Conclusion…………...................................................................................38

5.1. Recap Of Main Thesis…….................................................................................38

5.2. Implications Of Findings……..………………………………………………………………….......39

5.3. Acknowledgement Of Limitations………………………………………...........................40

5.4. Directions For Future Research………………………………………...............................41

5.5. Final Reflections…………………………………………………...........................................42

Chapter 6 References..............................................................................................43

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1   Overview:

This dissertation explores the plausibility that matter, at its most fundamental level, instantiates mental properties. Engaging with panpsychism - a philosophical view that posits consciousness as intrinsic to all matter - the study lies at the intersection of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and scientific theory (Seager, 2020). It critically examines panpsychism’s explanatory strengths, philosophical implications, and the challenges it faces.

This dissertation does not undertake a comparative analysis of panpsychism alongside alternative theories of consciousness, such as physicalism or dualism. Rather, its central objective is to critically examine and respond to the principal objections that have been directed specifically at panpsychism. These include the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the Intrinsic Nature Problem, the Combination Problem, and the assertion that panpsychism lacks scientific legitimacy. The aim is to demonstrate that, when assessed on its own merits, panpsychism constitutes a philosophically coherent and scientifically credible framework for understanding consciousness.

The first key argument addresses the Intrinsic Nature problem: while physics describes how matter behaves, it remains silent on its intrinsic nature (Seager, 2006; Eddington, 2019, p. 175). Building on the work of Russell and Eddington, this dissertation suggests that consciousness, as experienced directly, plausibly constitutes the intrinsic nature of matter (Adams, 2007; Goff, 2017, p. 17). This view bridges the gap between subjective experience and objective science, offering a unified and parsimonious framework.

The second argument confronts the Combination Problem, which questions how simple, proto-conscious particles combine to form complex consciousness (Chalmers, 2017; Coleman, 2014). The dissertation reframes this issue as part of a broader scientific challenge - understanding emergent complexity, a problem also faced in evolutionary biology and information theory (Meyer, 2021; Berlinski, 1996). As such, the Combination Problem reflects a general limitation in scientific understanding, not a decisive objection to panpsychism specifically.

The third argument responds to the criticism that panpsychism lacks empirical evidence (Jarocki, 2024; Symes, 2022). The dissertation contends that, like theories in historical sciences such as geology and evolution, panpsychism can be justified through the scientific mode of reasoning, namely inference to the best explanation (Goff, 2017; Johnson & Provine, 1994). Historical examples like Darwin’s theory of evolution and the Big Bang show that explanatory coherence and scope - not solely direct observation - can establish scientific credibility. Panpsychism, by offering a coherent solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, deserves similar recognition (Goff, 2017; Thomas, 2022).

In conclusion, this dissertation argues that panpsychism provides a compelling and plausible account of consciousness as a fundamental aspect of reality. By engaging critically with its major challenges and offering novel responses, the study contributes meaningfully to contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and the metaphysics of consciousness.

1.2. Context:

The question of whether matter instantiates mental properties probes some of philosophy’s most enduring and foundational concerns: What is consciousness? How does it arise? And how does it relate to the physical world? These questions lie at the heart of metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, with implications extending into physics, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence.

Despite advances in cognitive science, the Hard Problem of Consciousness - explaining how subjective experience emerges from physical processes - remains unresolved (Chalmers, 2017). Panpsychism offers an alternative framework that challenges the dominant materialist paradigm, suggesting that consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality itself (Goff, 2017; Skrbina, 2017). This view has the potential to revolutionise both philosophical and scientific approaches to the mind.

Beyond academic discourse, the implications of panpsychism are profound. If consciousness pervades matter, it may transform how we view our place in the universe and how we relate ethically to nature, non-human entities, and emerging technologies. It encourages a more interconnected and holistic worldview, where mental properties are not confined to brains but embedded in the structure of reality.

Finally, this inquiry addresses a growing gap in contemporary thought. As thinkers like Nagel (2012) argue, materialist frameworks may fall short in explaining the richness of experience and the complexity of the cosmos. Panpsychism invites us to bridge the subjective and objective, reimagining the nature of consciousness, matter, and the universe itself.

Chapter 2: What Is The Intrinsic Nature Of Matter?

2.1 Solution To Intrinsic Nature Problem

This chapter advances the first major argument of the dissertation: that panpsychism offers a plausible and philosophically coherent solution to the Intrinsic Nature problem in physics. The core claim is that while physics excels at describing the external characteristics and behaviours of matter, it remains silent on the intrinsic nature of that matter - on what constitutes the essence of matter (Goff, 2019, p. 91; Eddington, 2019, p. 45). As highlighted by thinkers such as Russell and Eddington, physics is fundamentally a relational and descriptive science. It models the universe using equations that describe properties like mass, charge, and spin, but it does not explain what the essence of these entities are (Jylkkä, 2016; Jarocki, 2024).

Eddington (2019, p. 171) emphasised that physics provides us only with "pointer readings" - measurable outcomes observed through instruments - while remaining agnostic about the deeper nature of what is being measured (Eddington, 2019, p. 45; Goff, 2019, p. 91). For example, physics can describe how mass and force behave under Newton’s law of gravity, but it cannot explain what mass or force actually are intrinsically (Jaki, 2018, p. 9; Goff, 2019, p. 27). This epistemic limitation reveals that physics, though powerful in predictive scope, is not equipped to describe the essence of matter. As Jaki (2018, p. 11) argues, the defining characteristic of all material things is that they possess extension - spatial dimensions that allow for the attribution of measurable, quantitative properties. These properties are crucial for scientific inquiry, but they do not capture the essence or metaphysical identity of matter (Jaki, 2018, p. 8).

According to Jaki (2018, p. 8), the central limitation of science is that it can only address the measurable. When a proposition involves concepts that are not reducible to measurement - such as intrinsic qualities or subjective experience - science loses its explanatory power. For example, while physics can define an electron’s mass in terms of gravitational attraction and resistance to acceleration, and charge in terms of its interaction with other charges, these descriptions are purely relational (Goff, 2019, p. 90). They focus exclusively on how electrons behave rather than what they are intrinsically (Eddington, 2019, p. 175). As Eddington (1920, p. 175) noted, such relational knowledge does not provide access to the intrinsic reality underlying these interactions.

To illustrate this distinction, an instructive analogy will suffice. Consider a chess piece: knowing the characteristics of a bishop, tells us what it does within the system of the game, but not what it is - whether it is made of wood, plastic, or metal. Indicated then is that physics can describe the properties and characteristics of matter - like how a chess piece moves on a board - but it cannot reveal the essence or intrinsic nature of what the chess piece (matter) actually is (Goff, 2019, p. 91). Similarly, physics can describe an electron’s functional role and characteristics, namely charge or mass, but it does not tell us what an electron is, in terms of its intrinsic character (Eddington, 1920, p. 188; Goff, 2019, p. 91). This limitation strongly asserts that while physics is an unparalleled tool for predicting observable phenomena and describing the characteristics and properties of matter, it cannot penetrate the intrinsic nature or essence of matter (Goff, 2019, p. 91; Eddington, 2019, p. 175; Jarocki, 2024, p. 388; Jaki, 2018, p. 9).

This epistemological boundary presents an opportunity. The fact that science is restricted to describing the external and behavioural dimensions of matter leaves open a critical gap in our understanding - an explanatory gap that panpsychism seeks to fill. Crucially, human beings do have access to one window that reveals the intrinsic nature of matter: through introspection and the mind (Goff, 2019, p. 94; Eddington, 2019, p. 175). While physics gives us external quantitative readings of the brain - such as electrical activity and neurochemical patterns – our experience of consciousness provides direct insight into the intrinsic character of matter: the brain matter that generates conscious experience. Thus, consciousness represents a unique and privileged form of knowledge, revealing the sole window into the intrinsic nature of matter from the first-person perspective (Goff, 2019, p. 94).

The philosophical power of this proposal lies in its parsimony. If we know that at least one portion of the physical world - our brains - has consciousness as its intrinsic nature, and if physics tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature of matter elsewhere, then it is rational to infer that consciousness constitutes the intrinsic nature of matter (Goff, 2019, p. 94). This does not vitally mean that all matter is conscious in the same way human beings are, but rather that consciousness, in some minimal or proto-experiential form, may be the most coherent candidate for matter’s intrinsic nature or essence (Goff, 2019, p. 94; Eddington, 2019, p. 175).

This conclusion gains additional credibility from the lack of viable alternatives. As Eddington (1920, 1933) noted, if we reject the hypothesis that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter, we are left with Locke’s concept of substance as a mysterious, unknowable “we know not what.” This metaphysical agnosticism leaves us with a fractured and incomplete picture of reality. Panpsychism, by contrast, offers a unified framework - one that links the subjective with the objective and offers an elegant solution to the long-standing divide between mind and matter (Eddington, 1933; Goff, 2019, p. 94).

To summarise, the argument proceeds as follows: physics describes the relational and behavioural properties of matter but does not explain its intrinsic nature. Human beings, through introspective awareness, have access to one instance of the intrinsic nature of matter - consciousness. Since no alternative intrinsic property has been identified, it is plausible to conclude that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter. Panpsychism therefore stands as a coherent and parsimonious response to a fundamental explanatory gap in our understanding of the physical world.

2.2 Causal Structuralism:

While the Intrinsic Nature argument provides an initially compelling foundation for panpsychism, it has been met with significant resistance. One major line of critique holds that the very concept of an "intrinsic nature" is misguided. Critics argue that matter has no inner essence beyond its dispositional or relational properties (Hawthorne, 2001, pp. 361-378). According to this view - known as causal structuralism - reality is fully defined by the web of causal and structural relations among entities, rather than any hidden, intrinsic qualities (Sepetyi, 2023; Schneider, 2017; Hawthorne, 2001, pp. 361-378). As previously discussed, proponents of panpsychism argue that physics only tells us how matter behaves, not what it is in itself (Goff, 2019, p. 91). Since physics remains silent on the intrinsic nature of matter, and conscious experience is the only direct access we have to an intrinsic property, panpsychists infer that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter (Eddington, 1933). However, causal structuralists reject the initial premise: they deny that an intrinsic nature of matter even exists.

Causal structuralism contends that the nature of any physical entity, such as an electron, is exhausted by its causal powers - its dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain conditions (Eagle, 2009, p. 163; Hawthorne, 2001; Sepetyi, 2023). On this view, to understand what an electron is, one need only understand what it does. There is no further fact about its “inner essence” beyond its observable and relational characteristics (Alter and Pereboom, 2023; Saatsi, 2017). Thus, if causal structuralism holds, then physics already gives us a complete account of matter. The mathematical models describing an electron’s behaviour are not partial but exhaustive (Hawthorne, 2001; Alter and Pereboom, 2023). Under this framework, physical entities are not “things” in the traditional sense, but rather patterns of activity - “doings” rather than “beings” (Alter and Pereboom, 2023; Saatsi, 2017). Accordingly, if there is nothing more to matter than what it does, then the notion of consciousness as an intrinsic aspect of matter becomes superfluous. Panpsychism’s claim to explanatory necessity collapses.

However, panpsychists have developed a series of counterarguments that expose potential flaws in the causal structuralist position. One of the most pressing concerns is the circularity and regress problem. If the nature of a disposition is defined solely in terms of the behaviours it produces, then each disposition refers to another, which in turn refers to another, leading either to circularity or an infinite regress (Goff, 2019, p. 90; Eagle, 2009; Azzano, 2023). For instance, we understand flammability by its manifestation – burning - but if every property is defined by reference to other dispositions, then no ultimate explanation is possible (Goff, 2017; Goff, 2019, p. 90). Assuming causal structuralism, the manifestation of any disposition – how it behaves under certain conditions - will be another disposition, and the manifestation of that disposition will be another disposition, and so on ad infinitum (Goff, 2019, p. 120; Eagle, 2009; Azzano, 2023). The buck is continually passed, and hence an understanding of the nature of any property is impossible (Goff, 2019, p. 120). In other words, a causal structuralist world is unintelligible (Goff, 2019, p. 120; Azzano, 2023). Therefore – if the causal structuralist are correct – then the world is unintelligible, insofar as every property is defined by another property, creating an infinite regress with no foundational explanation (Goff, 2017, p. 137).

To illustrate, consider the relationship between mass and spacetime curvature in general relativity. According to general relativity, mass and spacetime stand in a relationship of mutual causal interaction: mass curves spacetime, and the curvature of spacetime in turn affects the behaviour of objects with mass (as matter tends, all things being equal, to follow geodesics though spacetime) (Hobson, Efstathiou and Lasenby, 2006; Wüthrich and Huggett, 2020). What then, is mass? According to causal structuralism, we understand mass through its effects - how it curves spacetime (Ryder, 2009; Goff, 2019, p. 120).  But to really understand what this amounts to metaphysically, as opposed to being able merely to make accurate predictions, we need to know what spacetime curvature is (Goff, 2019, p. 120; Berenstain, 2016). What is spacetime curvature? For a causal structuralist, we understand what spacetime curvature is only when we know what it does, which involves understanding how it affects objects with mass (Goff, 2019, p. 120; Ryder, 2009; Saatsi, 2017; Dorato, 2000). But we understand this only when we know what mass is. And so, we find ourselves in a classic “Catch 22”: we can understand the nature of mass only when we know what spacetime curvature is, but we can understand the nature of spacetime curvature only when we know what mass is (Goff, 2019, p. 122; Azzano, 2023; Berenstain, 2016).

Causal structuralists may respond that this circularity is not problematic because their view entails a form of holism: the nature of one property is inherently defined in relation to others (Goff, 2019, p. 122; Berenstain, 2016). To demand that mass be defined in isolation from spacetime curvature, they argue, is to presuppose that causal structuralism is false. If causal structuralism is true, all physical properties must be defined “all at once” in terms of a broader web of relations (Goff, 2019, p. 122).

However, this holistic model does not resolve the core issue. While one can specify mass by locating its position in a causal network, this does not reveal what it does in concrete, physical terms (Goff, 2017; Berenstain, 2016). According to causal structuralism, knowing what something is means knowing what it does. But if understanding any one property requires referencing others in an endless loop, we never arrive at a foundational explanation (Goff, 2017, p. 137; Berenstain, 2016). Here’s another way of putting the circularity objection. If every word was defined in terms of other words, then all definitions would ultimately be circular, and language could never reach beyond itself. In order to get meaning going, we need to have some primitive concepts that are not defined in terms of other concepts (Hawthorne, 2001; Goff, 2017; Brüntrup and Jaskolla, 2017). The concepts of physical science are not primitive but inter-defined: mass is characterised in terms of distance and force, distance and force are characterised in terms of other phenomena, and so on until we get back to mass (Hawthorne, 2001). Our concepts of consciousness, in contrast, are primitive in the required sense: a feeling is not defined in terms of anything other than itself (Hawthorne, 2001).

The same is true, although in a more complex way, of the description of physical reality offered by the causal structuralist. If causal structuralism is true, it is logically impossible to gain understanding of what anything does and hence logically impossible to gain understanding of what anything is (Hawthorne, 2001). This evidently is an unintelligible view (Hawthorne, 2001).

Panpsychism avoids this regress by offering a non-circular account of the intrinsic nature of matter. The character of a conscious experience is not defined in terms of anything else; it is known directly and intrinsically (Goff, 2017; Brüntrup and Jaskolla, 2017). For example, the pain I feel right now is something I am immediately acquainted with. Its character is not inferred or defined by relations, but directly grasped. Therefore, if mass is a form of consciousness, then in specifying the character of that form of consciousness, we have specified what mass is - without invoking any further property (Goff, 2017).

Thus, the central point of this aforementioned argument is that causal structuralism creates a circular dependency between properties, such as mass and spacetime curvature, making it impossible to fully understand either without presupposing an understanding of the other (Hawthorne, 2001; Goff, 2019). Vitally, this argument presses us to the conclusion that there must be more to physical entities than what they do: physical things must also have an ‘intrinsic nature’, as philosophers tend to put it (Hawthorne, 2001; Goff, 2019). However, given that physics is restricted to telling us only about the behaviour of physical entities ­– electrons, quarks and indeed spacetime itself – it leaves us completely in the dark about their intrinsic nature. Physics tells us what matter does, but not what it is (Goff, 2019).

To summarise this segment, the central critique of causal structuralism lies in its inability to provide a foundational explanation for the intrinsic nature of matter, as it defines properties solely in terms of their relations and behaviours (Hawthorne, 2001). This approach leads to an infinite regress or circular dependency, as seen in the relationship between mass and spacetime curvature, where understanding one requires prior understanding of the other (Goff, 2019). Such reasoning renders the world unintelligible, suggesting that physical entities must possess more than their observable behaviours - they must have an intrinsic nature (Eddington, 2019, p. 175; Hawthorne, 2001). Thus, physics focuses only on describing what matter does, offering no insight into what matter intrinsically is (Hawthorne, 2001). This gap highlights the strength of the Intrinsic Nature argument in panpsychism, which asserts that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of matter. The reasoning is as follows: physics does not provide insight into the intrinsic nature of matter (Goff, 2019; Eddington, 2019, p. 175). The only window we have into the intrinsic nature of matter is through access to our minds – which reveals consciousness. Therefore, it follows that the intrinsic nature of matter is best understood as consciousness (Eddington, 2019).

Chapter 3: Solution To The Hard Problem

3.1 Hard Problem Of Consciousness:

The central aim of this chapter is to argue that panpsychism provides a compelling and coherent solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Rather than attempting to compare panpsychism with alternative theories of mind, the chapter focuses on defending its plausibility by showing how it responds to the most prominent philosophical objections. Specifically, it is argued that panpsychism addresses the Hard Problem by positing consciousness as a fundamental property of matter, thereby avoiding the unexplained emergence that characterises both physicalism and dualism. The chapter further addresses the Combination Problem - the challenge of explaining how simple conscious entities might combine to form unified experiences - by framing it as part of a broader scientific difficulty in explaining the emergence of complexity, analogous to unresolved questions in evolutionary biology. Through this two-part defence, the chapter seeks to establish that panpsychism offers a viable and philosophically serious account of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

A compelling argument in support of panpsychism is its potential to provide a coherent solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. This term, famously coined by David Chalmers, refers to the philosophical difficulty of explaining why and how subjective experiences – qualia - arise from physical processes in the brain (Chalmers, 2017; Blamauer, 2011; Cunningham, 2024, pp. 28-54). Unlike the so-called “easy problems” of consciousness, which concern the explanation of cognitive functions such as perception, memory, and behaviour, the Hard Problem focuses on the qualitative, first-person dimension of experience - what it feels like to see red, to feel pain, or to be aware (Chalmers, 2017; Blamauer, 2011; Cunningham, 2024, pp. 28-54).

While neuroscience can describe the neural correlates of sensory input and behavioural response, it remains unclear why these processes are accompanied by conscious awareness at all (Cunningham, 2024, pp. 28-54; Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019, p. 28). For example, the brain's processing of certain light wavelengths results in the perception of red, yet the subjective experience of “redness” cannot be captured by objective physical description alone. This gap arises because third-person physical explanations cannot fully account for first-person subjective experience (Chalmers, 2017; Goff, 2019, p. 32; Blamauer, 2011).

Physicalist theories attempt to explain consciousness purely in terms of physical entities and processes (Nagel, 1965; Blamauer, 2011). However, many philosophers and scientists acknowledge that we currently lack even a rudimentary understanding of how conscious experience could arise from non-conscious matter (Nagel, 1965, p. 339; Chalmers, 2017; Blamauer, 2011, p. 7). As Chalmers (2017) notes, no matter how complex the physical mechanism - such as neural firing patterns - it remains conceivable that it could function identically without producing any subjective experience. This suggests that mechanistic explanations, though powerful in accounting for behaviour, offer no insight into the existence of experience itself (Chalmers, 2017; Block, 2002; Klein and Barron, 2020).

Against this background, panpsychism offers a vital alternative. In contrast to dualism, which posits the existence of two fundamentally different substances - mind and matter - and often invokes unexplained mental emergence or supernatural intervention, panpsychism avoids invoking metaphysical discontinuities (Blamauer, 2011; Demertzi et al., 2009; Goff, 2019, p. 85). Rather, it holds that human beings are complex assemblies of components that are themselves constituted by matter with rudimentary forms of consciousness (Blamauer, 2011; Goff, 2019, p. 84).

Panpsychism shares physicalism’s commitment to the continuity of nature, but it differs in one key respect: it postulates that the basic constituents of matter already possess simple forms of consciousness, or proto-consciousness, which collectively give rise to the complex experiences of human and animal minds (Blamauer, 2011; Goff, 2019, p. 85; Chalmers, 2015, p. 247). This framework avoids the need for consciousness to suddenly emerge from entirely non-conscious processes and instead treats consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality - present in a basic form at the lowest levels of matter (Goff, 2019, p. 85).

Importantly, this approach does not attempt to reduce consciousness to something more fundamental. Rather, it posits basic forms of consciousness as fundamental properties of reality - akin to mass or charge (Goff, 2019, p. 85; Cunningham, 2024). While this may initially seem speculative, there is precedent within the history of science. As Revonsuo (2017) and Jones (2013) observe, the scientific acceptance of electromagnetism required the postulation of entirely new fundamental forces and properties. By analogy, the scientific explanation of consciousness may similarly require the recognition of consciousness or proto-consciousness as a basic ontological feature (Chalmers, 1997; Goff, 2019, p. 85). Thus, panpsychism does not rely on unexplained emergence, nor does it violate the unity of scientific explanation. It simply posits that consciousness is woven into the fabric of the universe, rather than being an anomaly or afterthought. In this way, it offers a parsimonious and elegant response to the Hard Problem by proposing that consciousness is not something that emerges from matter but is, in fact, what matter is at its most fundamental level (Goff, 2019; Blamauer, 2011).

This proposal also sidesteps the conceptual difficulties of dualism and the explanatory limitations of materialism. Unlike dualism, it does not face the interaction problem - how mind and matter influence one another - since both are part of the same ontological fabric. Unlike materialism, it does not ignore or explain away consciousness but treats it as a real and irreducible phenomenon in need of explanation (Jaworski, 2011; Richert and Harris, 2008).

Therefore, panpsychism uniquely addresses the Hard Problem of Consciousness by grounding experience in the intrinsic nature of matter itself (Goff, 2019; Blamauer, 2011; Shan, 2006). Instead of positing consciousness as emergent from purely physical processes, it proposes that physical processes are themselves proto-conscious. By doing so, it bridges the explanatory gap that has long plagued theories of mind, offering a unified, non-reductive, and scientifically grounded account of consciousness.

3.2 The Combination Problem Of Panpsychism:

However, a critical counterargument must be addressed here. Panpsychism, as previously noted, proposes that human consciousness is merely intricate arrangements of elements already present in basic matter (Goff, 2019, p. 101). This perspective is offered as a solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Panpsychists argue that consciousness is not reducible to anything more fundamental (Shan, 2006). Instead, they claim that panpsychism resolves the Hard Problem by explaining consciousness as an aggregation of smaller, more basic forms of consciousness (Blamauer, 2011). It asserts that the key distinction between panpsychism and physicalism is that the fundamental components of the material world also possess very basic forms of consciousness, from which the more complex consciousness of humans and other animals emerges (Blamauer, 2011; Goff, 2019). Thus, panpsychism offers a solution to the Hard Problem by explaining human consciousness not through entirely non-conscious elements but through simpler forms of consciousness inherent in basic matter (Goff, 2019).

Yet, a significant challenge to this perspective is the Combination Problem (Chalmers, 2017; Mørch, 2014). If consciousness is indeed a fundamental aspect of the material world and serves as the basis for the complex consciousness observed in humans and other animals, it raises an important question: how do these fundamental components of reality combine to produce the unified and sophisticated experience of human consciousness (Chalmers, 2017; Coleman, 2014; Mørch, 2014). Addressing this issue is critical for the coherence of the panpsychist framework.

The central crux of this argument is that it questions how conscious entities, like fundamental particles, combine to form the unified, complex consciousness observed in humans and other animals (Chalmers, 2017, p. 218; Goff, 2019, p. 103; Mørch, 2014). If each particle has its own isolated consciousness, how do these “little minds” blend to form a “big mind” (Chalmers, 2017, p. 218; Coleman, 2014; Harris, 2021)? This forthcoming novel argument proposes that this critique is not necessarily a flaw of panpsychism, but rather is a broader limitation in our current understanding of how particles interact and organise to produce complex matter generally (Meyer, 2014, p. 169; Berlinski, 1996). Thus, it would be unjust to dismiss or criticise panpsychism for its inability to explain precisely how proto-conscious forms give rise to human consciousness, because this limitation is not unique to panpsychism but reflects a broader gap in our current scientific understanding (Meyer, 2014, p. 169; Berlinski, 1996).

The key point here is that science, as it stands, cannot fully explain how fundamental particles combine to form functionally specified biological information or complex structures of any kind (Berlinski, 1996). Therefore, this argument shifts the focus away from the so-called Combination Problem and emphasises that the issue is not a flaw of panpsychism itself but rather a limitation of our broader understanding of how fundamental particles organise and interact.

While we understand how physical components, like bricks, combine to create larger structures, it is harder to conceive how small conscious experiences might merge into a single, unified mind (Goff, 2017; Mørch, 2014). If each particle has its own isolated consciousness, how do these “little minds” blend to form a “big mind” (Mørch, 2014; James, 1890; Goff, 2017)? This issue is critical because the ultimate goal of any theory of consciousness is to explain the rich, unified experiences of humans and other sentient beings (Goff, 2019). Materialism attempts to explain animal consciousness through physical brain states, while panpsychism seeks to explain it through particle-level consciousness (Lund, 2014). If panpsychism cannot provide a better solution to this problem than materialism, it risks losing its explanatory advantage (Goff, 2019). Thus, the Combination Problem highlights a significant gap in panpsychist theory: the need to articulate how simple conscious experiences combine into complex ones (Mørch, 2014, 2014; Goff, 2019). Addressing this challenge is essential for panpsychism to fulfil its promise as a comprehensive theory of consciousness (Montero, 2017; Goff, 2019; Chalmers, 2017).

While this initially appears to pose a significant challenge to panpsychism, it need not necessarily undermine its plausibility. A novel argument that has been entirely unnoticed in the philosophy of mind, draws in from our knowledge of evolution. One central issue in Darwinian evolution is referred to as the Combinatorial Inflation argument (Meyer, 2014, pp. 169-180; Berlinski, 1996). The combinatorial inflation problem in evolution demonstrates the difficulty of explaining how complex, adaptive systems - such functional biological specified information - emerges from simpler, less organised components (Meyer, 2014, p. 180; Berlinski, 1996). Functionally specified biological information refers to the specific sequences of nucleotides in DNA or amino acids in proteins that are necessary for life to function, also known as DNA  & RNA (Meyer, 2014, p. 180). Meyer (2014) argues that undirected processes like random mutation and natural selection cannot realistically account for the complexity and specificity of this information. The problem stems from the vast number of possible combinations of sequences, coupled with the rarity of functional sequences within that immense space, which Meyer terms "combinatorial inflation" (Berlinski, 1996; Meyer, 2014, p. 173).

It's worth examining the specifics of the combinatorial inflation problem in evolutionary theory, as this will help clarify its later relevance to the Combination Problem in panpsychism. Proteins, which are essential for nearly all biological processes, are made up of chains of amino acids arranged in specific sequences (Meyer, 2014). For a protein with a length of 150 amino acids, the total number of possible sequences is 20 to the power of 150, since there are 20 standard amino acids (Berlinski, 1996). This number - approximately 10 to the power of 195 - represents the total "search space" of possible combinations (Meyer, 2014, p. 172). To put this into perspective, the number of atoms in the observable universe is estimated to be around 10 to the power of 80 (Meyer, 2014, p. 173). The sheer size of this combinatorial space poses a daunting problem for evolutionary theory, which posits that functional sequences arose through random mutations over time (Meyer, 2014, p. 174; Denton and Scott, 1986). Meyer emphasises that exploring this vast search space to locate functional sequences is not feasible within the constraints of Earth's history (Eden, 1967). Even with billions of years of evolutionary time and countless organisms reproducing and mutating, the number of possible sequences far exceeds the number of trials nature could have conducted (Meyer, 2014, pp. 173-181; Denton and Scott, 1986). This mismatch between the size of the search space and the resources available for exploration highlights the improbability of finding functional biological molecules through random processes alone (Denton and Scott 1986).

Without getting much further into the nuances pertaining to evolutionary theory, in straightforward terms, this issue apparent to Darwinism fundamentally highlights a significant gap in our understanding of how fundamental particles and information come together to generate biologically functional specified information (Denton and Scott 1986) Meyer uses the example of bike locks to illustrate this concept. A basic bike lock with just three dials, each containing 10 digits (0-9), has 1,000 possible combinations (10 × 10 × 10). If the number of dials is increased to four, the combinations rise to 10,000 (10 × 10 × 10 × 10). As the number of dials continues to grow, the number of possible combinations increases exponentially, making it progressively more difficult to guess the correct combination (Meyer, 2014, p. 172). Thus, the argument presented is this: in evolutionary theory, the combinatorial inflation problem highlights a key challenge - explaining how complex systems can emerge from simpler components through undirected processes (Meyer, 2014, p. 180).

Therefore, extending this line of reasoning to panpsychism, it can be argued that the Combination Problem - often seen as a challenge to panpsychism - is not necessarily a flaw in the theory itself. Instead, it reflects a broader limitation in our knowledge about how particles, atoms, or information interact and organise to produce complex phenomena, whether that be biological functionality or, in the case of panpsychism, consciousness as we experience it today (San Miguel et al, 2012; Charalampous, 2021). Thus, the Combination Problem is less a critique of panpsychism itself and more a reflection of the broader scientific challenge of explaining the emergence of complexity. In turn, panpsychism remains a viable theory, as this issue does not undermine its foundational premise but instead highlights gaps in our understanding of the underlying processes that govern the formation of complex systems generally.

When applied to panpsychism, the combinatorial problem underscores a fundamental question about how elementary particles, each potentially possessing simple mental properties, could combine to form the rich, complex consciousness observed in living organisms (Chalmers, 2017, p. 218). Yet this challenge mirrors the very same difficulty encountered in explaining how elementary particles combine to form the intricate biological systems found in RNA, DNA, and proteins (Meyer, 2014, p. 172). The improbability of these combinations occurring purely by chance reflects a general scientific puzzle about how complexity emerges, rather than a specific flaw in panpsychism (Meyer, 2014, pp. 172-181).

My central argument is that dismissing panpsychism solely due to its inability to resolve the Combination Problem would be unwarranted, given that our current scientific understanding - including the widely accepted theory of evolution - also falls short of explaining precisely how fundamental particles combine to generate functionally specified biological information.

In summary, the primary reason for introducing this argument is tied to reaffirming panpsychism’s ability to answer the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Panpsychism offers a valid solution by proposing that human consciousness is not derived entirely from non-conscious elements but instead emerges from simpler forms of consciousness inherent in basic matter (Stark, 2025). However, critics have raised a significant challenge: if consciousness arises from these simpler forms, panpsychism must be able to explain how elementary particles combine to produce the unified and sophisticated experience of human consciousness (Chalmers, 2017, p. 223). The aforementioned counterargument contends that dismissing panpsychism on this basis is unjustified. This is because similar gaps exist in other widely accepted theories, such as evolutionary theory, which also struggles to explain precisely how fundamental particles combine to generate functionally specified biological information (Meyer, 2014, p. 181).

Thus, these limitations reflect not a specific flaw in panpsychism, but a broader shortcoming in our current scientific understanding of how fundamental particles and components combine. In turn, rather than discrediting panpsychism, this challenge highlights the need for further investigation into the mechanisms of combination across both scientific and philosophical domains. Due to this, panpsychism still should be seen as a significant theory for addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness, despite the challenges it shares with other theories regarding our broader lack of understanding about how fundamental particles combine to form specified information.

Chapter 4: The Scientific Case For Panpsychism

4.1 The Problem Of Empirical Evidence

This chapter argues that panpsychism is scientifically plausible, primarily by demonstrating its alignment with inference to the best explanation (IBE) -  a widely accepted mode of reasoning employed in historical sciences such as geology and evolutionary biology. As such, panpsychism qualifies as a legitimate scientific hypothesis, even in the absence of direct empirical evidence. Since panpsychism offers a coherent and parsimonious response to both the Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Intrinsic Nature Problem, the theory warrants serious consideration within scientific and philosophical discourse.

A common objection is that panpsychism lacks empirical evidence for the claim that consciousness is an intrinsic property of matter (Roelofs, 2021, p. 52), leading some to dismiss it as speculative. However, this objection neglects two important points. First, many foundational scientific theories - such as atomism and the molecular hypothesis - were initially developed through conceptual reasoning rather than direct observation, given the absence of necessary empirical tools at the time (Chalmers, 2005; Henry, 2003, p. 139; Meinel, 1988, pp. 68-70). These theories, once speculative, later became central to modern science and resonate with current understandings in quantum mechanics (Vallabhajosula, 2009). Panpsychism, by analogy, may similarly evolve from theoretical framework to empirically supported model.

Second, panpsychism’s legitimacy lies in its explanatory power, a key criterion underpinning many accepted scientific theories. It employs IBE, a well-established method in disciplines where direct experimentation is difficult or impossible - such as cosmology, geology, evolutionary biology, and paleontology - where theories are judged by their ability to best explain available evidence (Meyer, 2021, p. 284; Lipton, 2017; Peirce, 1883). By the same standard, panpsychism can be evaluated through its explanatory coherence and scope, even without immediate empirical confirmation.

4.2 The Limits of the Scientific Paradigm

A central criticism of panpsychism is that, although it posits consciousness as a fundamental feature of reality - even at the level of elementary particles - there is currently no empirical evidence or measurable data to support the claim that inanimate matter, such as electrons or quarks, possesses any form of awareness or subjective experience (Churchland, 2013). This lack of observational support leads many to question the theory’s plausibility, particularly in contrast to physicalist accounts, which associate consciousness with the highly complex organisation of matter found in living systems (Engelhardt, 2023; Churchland, 2013). Consequently, critics argue that panpsychism should be dismissed as a speculative hypothesis, lacking both empirical grounding and scientific justification (Symes, 2022, p. 86; Brüntrup and Jaskolla, 2016, p. 126).

One of the key counterarguments to the empirical objection is that the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily invalidate a theory, nor does it justify dismissing it outright (Koslowski, 1996, p. 28). Historically, many foundational scientific theories - such as atomism and the molecular hypothesis - originated from abstract reasoning rather than direct observation or measurable data (Pyle, 1995). These early theories were developed by philosophers and scientists who, in the absence of empirical tools, relied on rigorous conceptual argumentation (Chang, 2004; Lakatos, 1978). Over time, advances in technology enabled the empirical verification of these once-speculative ideas, which were then assimilated into the scientific mainstream (Achinstein, 2001; Hacking, 1983; Cartwright, 1983).

This historical precedent suggests that panpsychism may follow a similar path. Although its claims about consciousness at the microphysical level cannot yet be tested or falsified, this does not render the theory inherently defective (Goff, 2019, p. 83). As with atomism, a more comprehensive understanding of consciousness may require a paradigm shift in science - one that future developments in neuroscience and physics could help bring about (Nagel, 2012; Chalmers, 1995). Just as the atom was once an abstract postulate later confirmed by empirical science, the nature of consciousness may, in time, be similarly integrated into a broader scientific framework (Goff, 2019, p. 83; Nagel, 2012; Chalmers, 1995).

The notion that panpsychism may require a scientific revolution to accommodate consciousness points to the limitations of the current scientific paradigm (Nagel, 2012, p. 42). If consciousness is indeed a fundamental feature of reality, then a framework that focuses primarily on measurable, physical properties is insufficient for explaining it (Goff, 2019, p. 112; Nagel, 2012, p. 42; Chalmers, 1995, p. 13). The ongoing failure to integrate consciousness within this paradigm suggests that new methods, concepts, or theoretical models may be necessary to advance our understanding (Nagel, 2012, p. 42; Chalmers, 1995, p. 13). As with earlier scientific revolutions, a significant shift in perspective is required to adequately account for the subjective dimension of experience and incorporate it into a more expansive scientific worldview. Thomas Kuhn supports this view in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), where he argues that paradigm-changing theories often begin as speculative and are initially resisted for challenging entrenched assumptions (Kuhn, 1997, p. 59). Such theories, Kuhn argues, are essential to scientific progress because they introduce new conceptual frameworks capable of resolving anomalies that the prevailing model cannot (Kuhn, 1997, p. 61). For example, Einstein’s theory of relativity was once seen as abstract and counterintuitive within the Newtonian paradigm, but eventually became accepted as a deeper explanation of gravitational phenomena upon empirical investigation (Howard, 2014; Kuhn, 1997, p. 26). Likewise, panpsychism - though lacking current empirical confirmation - may represent the kind of theoretical innovation Kuhn describes: one that becomes indispensable when existing models fall short in addressing enduring mysteries such as consciousness.

A paradigm shift in science is necessary because the modern scientific worldview - initiated by Galileo in the 17th century - was built around quantitative measurement and excludes the subjective, qualitative dimension of experience (Goff, 2017, p. 119). Galileo sought to make the study of nature rigorous and objective by prioritising mathematical precision and focusing on measurable phenomena (Koyré, 1957; Goff, 2017, p. 97). To support this approach, he introduced a conceptual division between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities - such as size, shape, motion, and quantity - could be described mathematically and were considered the true attributes of physical reality. In contrast, secondary qualities - like colour, taste, smell, and sound - were seen as subjective impressions arising within the observer (Nagel, 1989, p. 76; Goff, 2017, p. 97). Galileo argued that while primary qualities could be studied scientifically, secondary qualities were personal and variable, and thus excluded from the domain of objective science (Tarnas, 2010, p. 263; Goff, 2017, p. 97; Searle, 1992, p. 85). According to Galileo, subjective experiences could not be scientifically examined because they were not part of the external world in the same way as physical properties (Goff, 2017, p. 119; Tarnas, 2010 p. 263). These qualitative aspects were instead classified as mental phenomena and deemed irrelevant to the study of nature (Searle, 1992; Goff, 2017, p. 119). Galileo’s framework was revolutionary in that it enabled science to advance by concentrating solely on what could be mathematically measured and quantified. This division laid the foundation for the scientific revolution and drove remarkable progress in fields like physics, astronomy, and the natural sciences (Goff, 2017, p. 51; Howard, 2014). Yet, this progress came at a cost: the systematic exclusion of subjective experience from scientific inquiry created a fundamental blind spot. Science could identify the wavelengths of light corresponding to the colour red, but not why or how we perceive the sensation of “redness” (Nagel, 1989; Goff, 2017). It could measure sound waves, but not explain the internal experience of hearing a melody. In this way, the subjective dimension of reality - consciousness itself - was placed beyond the reach of scientific investigation (Goff, 2017; Koyré, 1957).

Galileo’s exclusion of subjective experience from scientific investigation was not the result of empirical discovery but a deliberate methodological decision (Goff, 2017, p. 63; Koyré, 1957). While this move was instrumental in advancing the physical sciences, it introduced a conceptual gap that endures: the persistent inability of modern science to account for consciousness (Goff, 2017, p. 63). As Goff argues, this is because the scientific method is specifically designed to examine the objective and measurable aspects of reality - yet consciousness, by its very nature, is qualitative, subjective, and first-person (Goff, 2017, p. 160). The very tools that made science powerful are also those that render it ill-equipped to study the inner, experiential dimension of mind.

Thus, the key assertions here is twofold. First, the lack of current empirical data should not be sufficient grounds to dismiss a theory outright. Many now-established scientific theories - such as atomism, heliocentrism, and relativity - began as abstract explanatory models, long before they were supported by direct empirical confirmation (Goff, 2017, p. 18). Progressive scientific theories often originate as metaphysical abstractions, which only later generate testable predictions and empirical support (Lakatos, 1978; Goff, 2017, p. 18). Given panpsychism’s simplicity and its explanatory power, it warrants serious philosophical and scientific consideration.

Second, as numerous scholars have argued, the modern scientific paradigm - initiated by Galileo - deliberately excluded subjective qualities, such as consciousness, in order to develop a mathematically precise model of nature (Burtt, 1924; Koyré, 1957; Searle, 1992, p. 85). Galileo’s distinction between primary (quantifiable) and secondary (qualitative) properties created a structural division that still shapes modern science (Nagel, 1986, p. 76). As a result, consciousness - the qualitative, first-person dimension of experience - falls outside the scope of a scientific framework built to measure only what is quantitative (Whitehead, 1925). Science, in its current form, ends where the measurable ends.

If consciousness cannot be reduced to or explained by current empirical methods, this suggests the need for a new scientific paradigm - one that expands the current paradigm to include subjective experience. Panpsychism, in this light, not only offers strong explanatory coherence but also reveals the epistemic limitations of the existing scientific model. It functions as a conceptual bridge between mind and matter, urging us to rethink the boundaries of scientific inquiry. Scientific progress is not always driven by empirical data alone. Throughout history, creative imagination and conceptual innovation have been just as crucial in advancing knowledge (Goff, 2017, p. 18). Therefore, panpsychism should be taken seriously - not because it is currently empirically verified, but because of its coherence, parsimony, and potential to reshape our scientific worldview.

Given these foundational limits of empirical science - particularly its inability to engage with the subjective, qualitative nature of consciousness - it becomes necessary to consider alternative modes of scientific reasoning. One such method, widely accepted across various disciplines, is inference to the best explanation (IBE). This approach enables scientific progress even when direct observation or empirical falsification is not possible. The following section explores how IBE can be applied to the study of consciousness and how panpsychism, despite lacking current empirical support, may offer the most coherent and comprehensive explanation of the data we do possess.

4.3 Inference To The Best Explanation.

A further response to the claim that panpsychism is unscientific, and thus should be dismissed entirely, is to highlight its reliance on a widely accepted method of scientific reasoning: inference to the best explanation (IBE) (Cabrera, 2023, pp 1863 - 1896; Lipton, 2017). This method is foundational across many disciplines and is particularly central to what Stephen Jay Gould, the Harvard paleontologist and historian of science, called the “historical sciences” - fields such as geology, evolutionary biology, and paleontology - which operate differently from the more controlled “experimental sciences” like chemistry and physics (Meyer, 2009, p. 150).

Inference to the best explanation (IBE) is a widely recognised and scientifically legitimate form of reasoning, especially in fields where direct empirical falsifiability is limited or impossible - typically due to the unrepeatable nature of the phenomena under study (Meyer, 2009, pp. 150-160). Disciplines such as cosmology, geology, and evolutionary biology frequently rely on IBE to develop theories about events that cannot be directly observed or replicated, such as the Big Bang or the origin of life (Meyer, 2009, p. 165). In such cases, theories are assessed based on how well they account for the available evidence. A similar situation arises with the problem of consciousness, particularly in relation to subjective, first-person experience. Unlike singular historical events, consciousness is an ongoing phenomenon - but it remains similarly resistant to objective scientific analysis (Velmans, 2009, pp. 130-150; Searle, 1992, p. 85). As noted, first-person experience cannot be captured through third-person measurement, and no comprehensive empirical framework yet exists to quantify or explain it (Nagel, 2012, p. 76; Chalmers, 1995). This challenge is encapsulated by David Chalmers’ Hard Problem of Consciousness, which asks why and how physical processes in the brain produce subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995). Although neuroscience has advanced in mapping neural activity and its correlations with mental states, it still cannot explain why such processes feel like anything from the inside (Chalmers, 1995; Levine, 1983).

In other words, even if we can describe every detail of the brain’s neurochemical activity, such as how neurons fire or how information is processed, we are still left with the mystery of conscious experience itself - what it’s like to feel pain, to see red, or to taste chocolate (Jackson, 1982; Nagel, 2012). These are first-person, qualitative aspects of consciousness, often referred to as "qualia." They are not directly accessible through third-person observation or scientific instruments (Chalmers, 1996; Searle, 1992). This is what makes the problem so “hard”: it’s not just a matter of filling in gaps in our knowledge about the brain, rather it is a deeper philosophical issue about whether physical explanations alone can ever fully account for subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995; McGinn, 1999). The implication is that there may be something fundamentally missing in our current scientific frameworks, something that prevents us from bridging the explanatory gap between objective brain processes and the rich, inner life of conscious beings (Levine, 1983; Strawson, 2006).

Given these constraints, it is reasonable to argue that we should extend the use of inference to the best explanation to the study of consciousness. While we may not yet be able to empirically falsify certain theories of mind, IBE allows us to evaluate competing explanations based on their explanatory power, coherence, scope, and alignment with what we do know (Lipton, 2004; McGinn, 1999). In this way, IBE can serve as a valuable tool in helping us make progress on one of the most difficult and unresolved problems in both science and philosophy (Chalmers, 1996; Robinson, 2018).

Thus, having established that consciousness poses a unique challenge to empirical science - and that inference to the best explanation (IBE) offers a valuable tool for addressing such challenges - we can now turn to the broader scientific legitimacy of IBE as a method. This next section explores how inference to the best explanation has long played a foundational role in scientific reasoning, particularly in fields concerned with historical, unrepeatable events. By tracing the philosophical development and practical application of this mode of reasoning - from William Whewell’s palaetiology to Peirce’s abductive logic and Lipton’s account of explanatory power - we will see how IBE provides a framework for constructing credible, evidence-based theories even in the absence of direct empirical verification. This broader context will reinforce why panpsychism, despite its current lack of empirical confirmation, can still be scientifically respectable when evaluated through this explanatory lens.

4.4 Explanatory Power In Science

The legitimacy of this mode of reasoning - inferring unseen causes from present evidence - was further developed in the 19th century by Whewell, a leading scientist, philosopher, and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. In the context of growing public fascination with natural history in Victorian England, Whewell published two influential works: History of the Inductive Sciences (1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 2009, p. 151). This period saw significant scientific developments, including Charles Lyell’s groundbreaking Principles of Geology, the first formal descriptions of dinosaur fossils, and the emergence of evolutionary theories within elite scientific circles. Against this backdrop, Whewell introduced a crucial distinction between the experimental sciences - such as physics and chemistry - and what he termed palaetiology, or the study of past causes (Meyer, 2009,  p. 151). He argued that these historical sciences operated according to different principles than their experimental counterparts, and proposed that they could be distinguished in three key ways (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 2009, p. 151).

First, palaetiological or historical sciences are distinguished by their primary objective: rather than seeking to establish universal laws, they aim to reconstruct specific past events or ancient conditions (Meyer, 2009, p. 152). Second, they explain present-day phenomena - what Whewell termed “manifest effects” - by tracing them back to particular causal sequences in the past. While general laws may still play a secondary role, the primary focus lies in identifying historical chains of causation (Meyer, 2009, p. 151). For example, a geologist might account for the formation of the Alps by reconstructing a sequence of events involving tectonic collisions, sedimentary thrusting, and subsequent folding and faulting (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 2009, pp. 151-160). As historian of science Jonathan Hodge notes, Whewell recognised that historical sciences differ from those studying constant, universal forces like gravity; instead, they examine causes whose effects unfold in temporal succession (Hodge, 1991). Third, Whewell stressed that historical sciences employ a unique form of reasoning: they move backward from observed outcomes, using known cause-and-effect relationships to infer the past conditions that produced them (Whewell, 1837; Meyer, 2009, p. 152). As Stephen Jay Gould succinctly put it, these scientists “infer history from its results” (Meyer, 2009, p. 152). Paleontologists such as Gould and Simon Conway Morris, for instance, reconstruct ancient environments like the Cambrian period by examining fossil records. From this present-day evidence, they infer the conditions of long-extinct worlds - demonstrating the core method of palaetiological reasoning (Meyer, 2009, p. 151).

This method of reasoning is known as abductive reasoning (Meyer, 2009, p. 153; Peirce, 2014). First developed by the American philosopher and logician Charles Sanders Peirce, abduction is distinct from both induction and deduction (Meyer, 2009, pp. 151-153). While induction involves formulating general laws from repeated observations, and deduction applies general laws to specific cases, abduction operates differently. It entails inferring the most plausible unseen causes, facts, or events based on present evidence or clues (Aliseda, 2006). In this way, abduction enables us to construct likely explanations for phenomena that cannot be directly observed, by reasoning backward from effects to their possible causes (Meyer, 2009, p. 325).

However, abductive reasoning faces a key challenge: multiple explanations can often account for the same evidence (Meyer, 2014; Lipton, 2017). To address this, the nineteenth-century geologist Thomas Chamberlin introduced the “method of multiple working hypotheses” (Meyer, 2009, p. 154; Chamberlin, 1965). This approach encourages scientists to consider a range of possible causes and evaluate them systematically against the available evidence. When several hypotheses compete to explain the same data, historical scientists assess their plausibility based on explanatory power and fit with existing knowledge (Meyer, 2009, p. 154; Lipton, 2017; Cabrera, 2023). This comparative method - now widely known as “inference to the best explanation” - involves identifying the hypothesis that, if true, would best account for the observed facts, and provisionally treating it as the most likely to be correct (Lipton, 2017).

Importantly, the method of inference to the best explanation is not confined to scientific inquiry - it also plays a central role in everyday reasoning (Lipton, 2017; Meyer, 2009, p. 153; Chamberlin, 1965). As Peter Lipton illustrates, if we encounter unusual tracks in the snow, we might infer that someone wearing snowshoes recently passed by. Although alternative explanations are possible, we favour this hypothesis because it best accounts for the available evidence (Meyer, 2009, p. 153). This simple example shows how inference to the best explanation helps us navigate ambiguous or incomplete information, a process that scientists also rely on - especially when dealing with historical or circumstantial data (Lipton, 2017).

Lipton explains that the reasoning process begins with observed evidence and proceeds by asking: “what would, if true, best explain this?” (Lipton, 2017). Abductive inferences gain strength when they uniquely account for the facts in question (Lipton, 2017; Meyer, 2014, p. 153). What sets Lipton’s account apart is his emphasis on the tight link between inference and explanation: explanatory power becomes a key criterion for evaluating and comparing competing hypotheses. While figures like Peirce and Gould emphasised how scientists infer past causes from present effects, and Whewell showed how specific events are reconstructed from observed data, Lipton synthesised these insights, highlighting that inferring and explaining are not separate processes, but rather two sides of the same coin in scientific reasoning (Lipton, 2017; Meyer, 2009, p. 160).

This illustrates that scientists frequently assess competing hypotheses by comparing their explanatory power - the extent to which a hypothesis accounts for the available evidence (Schupbach & Sprenger, 2011; Meyer, 2014). Accordingly, the credibility we assign to an inference often hinges on how well it explains what we already know, not just on how accurately it predicts future events (Lipton, 2017; Meyer, 2009, p. 150). In making this point, Lipton challenged the common assumption that scientific theories are judged solely by their predictive accuracy. Instead, he argued that explanatory adequacy often carries equal, if not greater, weight in the evaluation of hypotheses (Lipton, 2017).

This approach to theory testing contrasts with that used in experimental science, where hypotheses are typically assessed by their predictive performance in controlled settings (Meyer, 2009, p. 150; Lipton, 2017). Nevertheless, this inferential method is far from limited to historical disciplines. For instance, Watson and Crick famously employed it when comparing different models of DNA’s structure (Meyer, 2014). Today, many scientists - including theoretical physicists, biochemists, psychologists, astronomers, and medical diagnosticians - as well as historians, detectives, and ordinary individuals, regularly rely on this reasoning to interpret evidence and make decisions (Lipton, 2017). In the most compelling cases, this process leads to a single, best explanation - often one that identifies the only known cause capable of producing the observed effect (Meyer, 2009, p. 71; Lipton, 2017).

Thus, having established the foundational role of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in both historical and contemporary scientific practice, we are now in a position to apply this framework to the case of panpsychism. If IBE is a legitimate and widely accepted method for evaluating theories where direct empirical testing is limited or impossible, then panpsychism - despite its lack of direct observational evidence - deserves serious scientific consideration. The following section explores how panpsychism aligns with the principles of IBE, demonstrating its explanatory power and situating it within a long-standing tradition of scientific reasoning.

4.5 Scientific Plausibility Of Panpsychism.

The central argument here is that panpsychism aligns with a widely recognised scientific method: inference to the best explanation (IBE) (Goff, 2017; Karman, 2012). This approach is not limited to experimental sciences like physics or chemistry but is foundational to historical sciences such as geology, paleontology, and evolutionary biology (Meyer, 2014; Schupbach & Sprenger, 2011). Because panpsychism employs the same reasoning framework, it can be considered scientifically plausible - even in the absence of direct empirical confirmation (Goff et al., 2001; Karman, 2012; Carruthers & Schechter, 2006).

Panpsychism aligns with inference to the best explanation by addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness - the question of how subjective experience arises from physical processes (Goff, 2017). Existing materialist and dualist frameworks struggle to offer a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of consciousness (Goff, 2017; Blamauer, 2011). Panpsychism provides a simple and unifying hypothesis: consciousness is a fundamental (intrinsic) property of matter, much like mass or charge (Goff, 2017). By positing that consciousness exists in some form at the most basic levels of reality, panpsychism avoids the need to explain how subjective experience emerges from purely non-conscious physical entities (Goff, 2017). It offers a coherent framework that integrates consciousness into the natural world, addressing a critical gap left by other theories (Goff, 2017).

One of the key strengths of panpsychism under the lens of IBE is its explanatory power (Goff, 2017). It does not require the introduction of entirely new ontological categories or entities but instead reinterprets existing ones (Sjöstedt, 2018; Goff, 2017). By treating consciousness as a fundamental property, panpsychism provides a parsimonious explanation that accounts for the presence of subjective experience in a way that aligns with our broader understanding of the universe (Sjöstedt, 2018; Goff, 2017).

Therefore, the absence of direct empirical evidence does not automatically disqualify panpsychism from being considered a scientifically credible theory (Sjöstedt, 2018). Many historical and theoretical sciences routinely function without the advantage of direct observation, instead grounding their claims in the explanatory strength of their frameworks. In this light, panpsychism’s compatibility with inference to the best explanation (IBE) provides a legitimate basis for its consideration as a plausible and scientifically relevant account of consciousness (Sjöstedt, 2018). To dismiss panpsychism outright because it has not been empirically verified would ignore the legitimacy of IBE as a scientific tool (Sjöstedt, 2018). Many groundbreaking theories - such as Darwin's theory of evolution or the hypothesis of tectonic plate movement - began as abductive inferences that gained empirical support over time (Stern, 1996; Hallam, 1975). Panpsychism, like these theories, should be evaluated based on its ability to offer a compelling and coherent explanation for the phenomena it seeks to address.

In summary, panpsychism employs the scientific method of inference to the best explanation (IBE), positioning it as a credible and philosophically serious theory despite the current absence of direct empirical validation. By relying on IBE - a method widely accepted across both experimental and historical sciences - panpsychism aligns itself with established scientific practice. Its explanatory strength, particularly in addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Intrinsic Nature Problem, supports its inclusion in contemporary debates on the nature of mind and matter. Although further empirical inquiry is needed, panpsychism's plausibility is reinforced by its coherence, parsimony, and capacity to resolve explanatory gaps that rival theories continue to face. Like many scientific theories that initially lacked empirical confirmation, panpsychism's legitimacy lies not solely in direct evidence but in its ability to provide a unified and parsimonious framework for otherwise intractable problems.

While this chapter has not offered an exhaustive comparison with all alternative theories, it has demonstrated that panpsychism meets the standards of inference to the best explanation. In turn, its philosophical coherence and scientific credibility merit serious consideration within both philosophical and scientific discourse.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Recap Of Main Thesis

To conclude, this dissertation has critically examined the plausibility of panpsychism by offering a sustained philosophical and scientific defense of the view that consciousness is a fundamental property of matter. Rather than undertaking a comparative evaluation of competing theories of mind, the project focused on the internal coherence, explanatory power, and epistemological grounding of panpsychism in light of its most prominent challenges - namely, the Intrinsic Nature Problem, the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the Combination Problem, and the claim that it lacks scientific legitimacy.

In addressing these challenges, it was argued that panpsychism plausibly fills the conceptual gap left by physical science regarding the intrinsic nature of matter. Physics excels at describing relational and behavioural properties but remains silent on what matter is in itself. Panpsychism responds to this by positing that consciousness - known directly through subjective experience - is the most plausible candidate for matter’s intrinsic nature. This insight simultaneously offers a parsimonious solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, as it avoids positing unexplained emergence from non-conscious processes.

The dissertation further defended the scientific legitimacy of panpsychism by appealing to the method of inference to the best explanation (IBE) - a form of reasoning foundational to many accepted scientific theories in geology, evolutionary biology, and cosmology. Although panpsychism lacks direct empirical confirmation, it was shown to be scientifically credible on the same grounds as other theoretical frameworks that began as speculative yet gained acceptance through explanatory success.

Ultimately, this study has argued that panpsychism is not only philosophically coherent but also scientifically plausible. It unifies subjective and objective accounts of reality without recourse to metaphysical dualisms or reductive materialism, and it does so while honouring the methodological constraints and historical precedents of scientific inquiry. In light of these findings, panpsychism deserves serious consideration as a viable framework for understanding consciousness - one that challenges the boundaries of current paradigms and calls for an expanded conception of both matter and mind.

In sum, the plausibility of panpsychism lies not merely in its philosophical appeal but in its ability to integrate philosophical insight with scientific reasoning. As a philosophical and scientific defense of consciousness as a fundamental property, this dissertation has sought to reposition panpsychism from the margins of metaphysical speculation to the center of serious academic inquiry.

5.2 Implications Of Findings

This dissertation’s findings carry significant theoretical, ethical, and scientific implications. Theoretically, panpsychism offers a unifying framework that bridges subjective experience and physical science by positing consciousness as a fundamental property of matter. This challenges the materialist paradigm and invites a more holistic understanding of reality. Ethically, if consciousness permeates all matter, it compels us to rethink our treatment of non-human entities, the environment, and artificial intelligence. This view promotes a broader ethical outlook grounded in interconnectedness and respect for all forms of existence.

Scientifically, panpsychism reveals the limits of materialist approaches in explaining consciousness. It highlights the need for new paradigms and interdisciplinary collaboration - particularly across philosophy, neuroscience, and physics - to develop methods capable of engaging with consciousness as an ontological primitive.

Together, these implications position panpsychism as a transformative framework with far-reaching consequences for how we understand mind, matter, and our place in the cosmos.

5.3 Acknowledgment of Limitations

Despite its explanatory power and potential, there are still broader issues that need to be addressed; firstly, whilst this dissertation has asserted that it is unjust to dispute the plausibility of panpsychism based upon the current lack of significant evidence, vitally the lack of empirical evidence for panpsychism highlights the current limitations of scientific methodologies in addressing questions about consciousness. These gaps underscore the need for continued interdisciplinary research that integrates insights from philosophy, neuroscience, and physics to refine the theory and address its shortcomings. Acknowledging these limitations does not diminish the plausibility of panpsychism but rather emphasises the ongoing need for theoretical and empirical innovation to advance our understanding of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world.

5.4 Directions For Future Research

This dissertation identifies several promising avenues for future research that could enhance our understanding of panpsychism.

First, further theoretical development is needed to address the Combination Problem - specifically, how elementary particles might combine to form complex conscious systems. While this issue reflects broader gaps in our understanding of emergent complexity (e.g., in biological information systems), integrating insights from information theory, emergence studies, and computational modeling may offer productive frameworks for refinement.

Second, although panpsychism currently lacks empirical support, future advances in neuroscience, quantum physics, and experimental technologies could open pathways for testing consciousness at microphysical levels. Identifying measurable correlates of consciousness in atomic or subatomic systems would provide vital support for panpsychist claims, though such work may require radically new methodologies.

Finally, cross-disciplinary collaboration will be essential. Integrating philosophy, neuroscience, physics, and computer science can foster more robust models of consciousness. For instance, studies in artificial intelligence and integrated information theory may reveal structural analogues between biological and non-biological consciousness.

In sum, advancing panpsychism requires both theoretical innovation and empirical exploration, supported by interdisciplinary research. These efforts could significantly shape future discourse on consciousness and the metaphysical structure of reality.

5.5 Final Reflection

Panpsychism challenges us to reconsider some of our most deeply held assumptions about the nature of reality. By proposing that consciousness is an intrinsic and fundamental aspect of matter, it offers a transformative framework that bridges the gap between subjective experience and the physical world. This perspective not only unifies mental and physical phenomena but also pushes the boundaries of both philosophical and scientific inquiry, encouraging a more holistic understanding of the cosmos.

While the plausibility of panpsychism remains an open question, this dissertation has demonstrated its explanatory power and potential to address enduring problems, such as the intrinsic nature problem and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In doing so, it highlights the theory’s capacity to reshape the discourse on consciousness, challenging the dominance of materialist paradigms and inviting new ways of thinking about existence.